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CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER: PLANNING AND NEW VENTURE SURVIVAL 
AMID POLITICAL AND CIVIL VIOLENCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Many entrepreneurs in developing economies face unstable environments due to violence and 
civil unrest. Yet, we know very little about how environments characterized by high levels of 
political and civil violence affect new venture processes and survival. Moreover, it is unclear 
whether standard theories about organizational strategy, such as planning, hold true in such 
environments. We explore these issues using a sample of 730 new ventures in Colombia from 
1997 to 2001. We find that political and civil violence decreases firm survival, increases the 

















The relationship between the institutional environment and organizational outcomes is of 
growing interest to strategy and entrepreneurship researchers (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Ingram and 
Silverman, 2002; Peng et al., 2009; Hiatt and Park, 2013). For example, scholars have examined 
the effects of state policies (Dobbin and Dowd, 1997; Fligstein, 2001; Henisz and Delios, 2001; 
Garcia-Canal and Guillen, 2008; Vaaler, 2008), culture (Hiatt, Sine and Tolbert, 2009), 
certification systems (Rao, 1994; Sine, David, and Mitsuhashi, 2007; Lee, 2009), and economic 
environments (Meyer, et al., 2009) on organizational performance, personnel strategies, 
alliances, and foreign-entry decisions. Despite this surge of attention, most studies in strategy 
and entrepreneurship assume stable, predictable environments in which new firms are founded 
(Spicer, McDermott, and Kogut 2000). Violence and unrest and the lack thereof are vital 
components of the institutional environment. Yet, many states around the world suffer from 
political and civil violence. In such contexts, we ask: How do high levels of violence affect new 
venture survival and moderate key entrepreneurial processes such as business planning—a 
fundamental strategic activity in which entrepreneurs engage (Hills, 1988)? This study 
contributes to the institutionally informed view of strategy by investigating how contexts 
characterized by high levels of violence affect new venture survival by creating uncertain 
environments that alter entrepreneurial perception of risk, disrupt resource flows and 
organizational routines, and thereby moderate the effects of incremental (day-to-day operational) 
and comprehensive (forward-looking strategic) planning.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Violence, uncertainty, and new venture survival 
The institutionally informed view of strategy and entrepreneurship highlights how formal 
(i.e., regulations, policies) and informal (i.e., norms, culture) constraints can shape strategic 3 
 
decision making and performance (Peng and Heath, 1996; Peng and Luo, 2000; Davis, 2005; 
Webb et al., 2009; Tolbert, David, and Sine, 2011). While this view has broadened strategy and 
entrepreneurship research beyond individual, industry- and resource-based factors by 
emphasizing the heterogeneous nature of institutions, research in this area has generally 
overlooked violence and civil unrest even though these reflect key aspects of the institutional 
environment (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997; Zahra and Wright, 2011; but see Honig, 2001).  
Environments characterized by high levels of political and civil violence are inherently 
unstable, difficult to predict, and uncertain (Bonanate, 1979). It is precisely the inability to 
anticipate where and against whom the violence will occur that causes high levels of uncertainty. 
However, unlike uncertainty described in traditional strategy literature (Miles and Snow, 1978; 
Ireland et al., 1987; Sawyerr, 1993), the effect of uncertainty created from violence is far greater 
in magnitude because it includes an additional, yet heavily weighted dimension: the individual’s 
physical security (Bonanate, 1979). When violence-induced uncertainty is high, it instills fear 
and concern for personal safety, which can affect rational economic decision making (Friedland 
and Merari, 1985; Porac and Shapira, 2001). Consequently, violence can lead founders, 
investors, buyers, and suppliers to make overly pessimistic risk estimates and more risk-averse 
choices, thereby creating erratic and at times irrational behavior (Lerner et al., 2003), 
contributing to new venture failure.  
For example, in our study, an entrepreneur from Bogotá recalled a sales visit to a distant 
neighborhood: as she pulled up to a red light, two men smashed the window of the car in front of 
her and kidnapped the driver, eventually holding him for ransom. After this experience, she 
reduced the scope and size of her venture and left her office and its environs as rarely as 4 
 
possible1. Because few of her existing and potential clients had telephones, her actions resulted 
in a decline in business and lost future opportunities. In a second example, an entrepreneur in 
Cali explained that political and civil unrest (either FARC or paramilitary activity) made him 
very apprehensive about whom he interacted with in business transactions, alliances, and social 
activities. Because it was difficult to know whether someone had ties to a paramilitary group, 
had been member of a labor union, or was sympathetic with guerrilla groups, he avoided contact 
with people he didn’t know well, including those who owned businesses in the same 
geographical area. “I was very careful about whom I had a cup of coffee with. I was cordial to 
my neighbors, but avoided doing things with them because I didn’t know their past. They could 
be friends with the paras, the guerrillas or drug traffickers.” Due to the high rate of violence, this 
entrepreneur avoided creating new business and social relationships with people outside of his 
neighborhood. 
In a final example, a mechanic in Medellín remarked that as erratic violence in Medellín 
flared, customers were more likely to stay home and to forgo servicing their cars. Not only did 
violence decrease customer demand, it also made it difficult for the entrepreneur to predict when 
customers would visit his shop. Thus, he could not rely on past customer patterns to staff his 
shop because customer behavior was no longer predictable; customers would come when the 
shop was closed or understaffed or wouldn’t come when it was open and fully staffed. This 
resulted in operating inefficiencies, poor customer service, and near insolvency. Similarly, 
several entrepreneurs remarked that during periods of violence, it was difficult to attract funding 
and credit because investors and creditors felt that the environment was too risky. 
                                                 
1 Despite the fact that the likelihood of being severely injured in a car accident was much greater than being 
kidnapped, it was being a victim of violence and kidnapping that shaped her decision to reduce the geographical 
reach of her business. 5 
 
In sum, political and civil violence creates high uncertainty about where and against 
whom physical harm will occur, thereby affecting the willingness of entrepreneurs to take risks 
and engage in important entrepreneurial tasks as well as fostering erratic behavior among 
suppliers, customers, and creditors, making it difficult for new ventures to operate. Given that 
new ventures often have few slack resources to shield them from abrupt changes in supplier, 
customer, and creditor behavior than established firms (Phillips, 2002; Aldrich and Ruef, 2006), 
such disruptions are likely to lead to venture failure.  
Hypothesis 1: Political and civil violence will negatively affect the likelihood of survival 
of entrepreneurial ventures. 
 
New venture planning and political and civil violence 
Organizations often cope with uncertainty by turning to planning processes (Armstrong, 
1982; Bracker and Pearson, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1989). We focus on two, non-mutually exclusive 
planning processes: incremental and comprehensive. Incremental planning is concerned with 
reacting to environmental issues at the operational level. It can increase new venture survival by 
helping firms (1) improve operational performance through regular evaluations of current 
processes (Mitzberg, 1994); (2) make quicker decisions regarding their day-to-day operations by 
revealing where they should place their attention when operational variance occurs (Shrader, 
Mulford, and Blackburn, 1989); and (3) recognize the relationships between resource flows and 
firm actions, thereby preventing potential bottlenecks and overproduction (Delmar and Shane, 
2003). In sum, we posit that new firms that engage in incremental planning will increase their 
probability of survival because such planning helps firms increase operational efficiency, adapt 
quickly to changes in the environment, and reduce costly mistakes.  
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of incremental planning will positively affect the likelihood 
of survival of entrepreneurial ventures. 
 6 
 
Comprehensive planning entails proactively planning at the strategic level (Bracker and 
Pearson, 1986; Bracker et al., 1988). Comprehensive planning is future-oriented and often 
focused on making significant changes based on assumptions about trends and organizational 
needs. The comprehensive planning process is characterized by exhaustiveness and inclusiveness 
when searching for information, analyzing it, and making detailed business plans. We posit that 
comprehensive planning can increase firm margins and cost savings by helping ventures to (1)  
set a clear vision for the future and establish concrete objectives and action items, thereby 
establishing important firm processes (Shrader et al., 1989); (2) evaluate the feasibility of 
engaging in a particular action, thus enabling ventures to avoid costly errors (Bracker and 
Pearson, 1986); and (3) improve long-term coordination among functional areas, thereby 
increasing future organizational efficiency (Castrogiovanni, 1996). However, because  
comprehensive planning requires greater resources to implement than incremental planning and 
creates firm processes that can foment organizational inertia and make adaptation difficult, the 
benefits derived from comprehensive planning are likely to decline at a marginal rate among new 
ventures as they engage in greater comprehensive planning. Hence we posit:   
Hypothesis 3: Higher levels of comprehensive planning will positively affect the 
likelihood of survival of entrepreneurial ventures, albeit at a marginally declining rate. 
 
Because both incremental and comprehensive planning make basic assumptions about the 
stability and predictability of the environment and are used by organizations to adjust to 
environmental uncertainty (Castrogiovanni, 1996), their effects are likely to change under 
conditions of high levels of violence. A fundamental assumption underlying the benefits of 
incremental planning is that as environments change, incremental planning helps ventures 
respond to such changes more quickly and effectively. Consequently, as market environments 
become more unpredictable and turbulent, such planning processes would help entrepreneurs 
react and adjust daily production, supply, and sales accordingly. For example, Luis, an 7 
 
entrepreneur working in the southern barrios of Bogotá, stated that he focused heavily on 
incremental planning by daily monitoring his production and sales and actively adjusting his 
prices, inventory, and product selection when violence between guerrillas and paramilitaries was 
high. This allowed his leather-goods shop to quickly adapt to a changing environment and 
survive when others failed. Given that incremental planning can lead to greater venture agility in 
uncertain and threatening environments, we argue that the effects of incremental planning on 
new venture survival will be stronger in such environments. 
Hypothesis 4: Incremental planning will contribute more to business survival as civil and 
political violence increases. 
 
  Entrepreneurs also use comprehensive planning to reduce environmental uncertainty 
(Shrader et al., 1989). Comprehensive planning differs from incremental planning in that instead 
of concentrating on the present, it focuses on the future and helps organizations make significant 
changes over time that improve their long-term capabilities. The success of long-range 
comprehensive planning is linked to the predictability of the environment because 
comprehensive plans are based on the entrepreneur’s best prediction about future market needs 
and growth opportunities (Mintzberg, 1994). However, in environments with extreme levels of 
uncertainty such as those plagued by civil and political violence, comprehensive planning may 
become less beneficial or even harmful as violence induces erratic behavior among customers, 
suppliers, and creditors, making strategic predictions less accurate and leading the venture to 
invest in building capabilities that are not aligned with future environmental changes.  
For example, Maria, an entrepreneur living in a barrio on the outskirts of Cartagena, 
Colombia, an area with little police presence, decided in 1999 to expand her ice cream business 
into a small restaurant; she created a long-term plan and began to implement it by paying a 
deposit for and taking delivery of the necessary equipment. Unfortunately, at the same time, the 
violence abruptly changed local habits—people spent less time out of their houses, which meant 8 
 
they were less likely to frequent her business and purchase ice cream and other types of food. 
Within six months she fell behind in her payments and lost her equipment, her savings, and her 
business. In sum, we argue that environments with high levels of violence and accompanying 
uncertainty will decrease the benefit of comprehensive planning to new venture survival. 
Hypothesis 5: Comprehensive planning will contribute less to business survival as civil 
and political violence increases. 
 
METHODS AND ANALYSIS 
We examined the impact of violence, planning, and their interaction on 770 
entrepreneurial ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001. (We dropped 40 firms because of 
missing data, leaving 730 for analysis.) These small and medium-sized ventures were located in 
Colombia’s five largest cities: Bogotá, Medellín, Cartagena, Cali, and Barranquilla.
2 During this 
study’s period, Colombians faced intense fighting between leftist political guerrillas and drug-
cartel-funded paramilitary forces. For the three decades prior to 2004, homicide had been the 
chief cause of mortality for men between the ages of 16 and 34 in Colombia’s principal cities 
(Safford and Palacios, 2002). By 2000, Colombia averaged 30,000 murders a year (about 1,000 
percent higher than U.S. homicide rates), 75 political assassinations a week, and 10 kidnappings 
a day (Dudley, 2004). One entrepreneur from the city of Medellín described the particularly 
brutal period between 1999 and 2001: 
There were weeks when 70 people died each day. Violence and theft were common. The 
government had no control. Sometimes when you caught a bus, five men would grab you 
and take everything out of your pockets. You couldn’t defend yourself, even if you had a 
gun. Every day they killed a bus driver. Buses stopped going to some neighborhoods, 
cutting those people off from the rest of the city. 
 
                                                 
2 Of these enterprises 19.9 percent were located in Bogotá, 19.8 percent in Medellín, 13.8 percent in Cartagena, 25 
percent in Cali, and 21.6 percent in Barranquilla. Of the entrepreneurs, 47.5 percent were female, and 52.5 percent 
were male; their formal education ranged from none to a four-year university degree. Between 1997 and 1998, 29.7 
percent of the 770 firms failed. Of those that survived, 30.6 percent failed between 1998 and 2001, leaving 40 
percent of the original 770 firms surviving in 2001. While single respondent bias may have occurred in some cases, 
the authors tried to assuage this concern by interviewing multiple members of each venture. 9 
 
In sum, the failure of the state to ensure personal safety, maintain order, and control 
unrest had created highly uncertain environments for Colombian entrepreneurs, but this violence 
varied in intensity from region to region and from year to year. Colombia thus presents a unique 
and valuable context in which to study how political and civil violence, business planning, and 
their interaction affect entrepreneurial survival. 
Data sources 
We obtained data from Fundación Corona, a large nonprofit that offers training and loans 
to small entrepreneurial start-up firms in Colombia. Corona administered three longitudinal 
surveys to start-up owners (in 1997, 1998, and 2001) that had used their services as well as to 
start-up owners from a matched sample of ventures that were randomly selected within the same 
region (Cabal et al., 1996, 1997). In order to identify ventures both in the formal and informal 
sectors, research teams knocked on every door within randomly selected neighborhoods (located 
in the same economic zones as the initial sample) asking residents if they had recently started a 
venture, and if so, inviting them to participate in the survey. We took multiple trips to Colombia 
to check the robustness of the data and to gather additional qualitative and quantitative data. We 
supplemented the survey data with economic data (described below) that we obtained from 
Colombia’s National Administrative Department of Statistics and from the Ministry of Defense.  
Dependent and independent variables 
  Our dependent variable is firm survival, and our independent variables are political and 
civil violence and incremental and comprehensive business planning. Because homicides and 
kidnappings are prominent features of political and civil violence in Colombia and many other 
emerging markets, we constructed our measure of violence using a factor analysis post-
estimation of two measures: annual regional homicides and annual regional extortive 10 
 
kidnappings.
3 We operationalized incremental planning using the product of two variables. The 
first was a scale measure that captured the extent to which the entrepreneur monitored, updated, 
and compared production and sales activities to changes in the environment. The second was a 
binary variable that captured the extent to which an entrepreneur went into detail when 
appraising production and sales activities. We measured comprehensive planning using a series 
of nine questions that addressed the extent to which the entrepreneur made detailed future plans. 
We aggregated these questions into a single item using post-factor estimation to create a scale 
representing the extent to which an entrepreneur engages in comprehensive planning.
4 Finally, 
we created a squared term for comprehensive planning to capture any declining benefits. 
Control variables 
At the founder level, we controlled for the entrepreneur’s years of prior work experience 
and the entrepreneur’s age, as well as whether the entrepreneur owns another business, whether 
the entrepreneur has a secondary job, whether the entrepreneur currently studies and the 
entrepreneur’s gender using binary variables (1=yes, 1=male) (Gimeno et al., 1997). Education 
was operationalized using an ordinal scale that reported the entrepreneur’s highest attained 
education level.  
At the organization level we controlled for the number of temporary employees, nonpaid 
employees, the number of apprentices, and whether the principal method of employee search was 
                                                 
3 Varying over time and geography, the two variables loaded onto a single factor with an eigenvalue of 1.10. A 
Cronbach’s alpha test reported a scale reliability coefficient of 0.80. The item’s values ranged from -1.133 to 2.509, 
with a mean of around zero. The five cities in the study are located in separate regions of Colombia, and each city 
accounts for well over 70 percent of its region’s population; thus political and civil violence in a given region largely 
represents that of its largest city. 
4 We conducted an exploratory factor analysis on the comprehensive planning variables related to market growth, 
equipment purchases, raw-material purchases, new product development and introduction, management training, 
location strategies, firm expansion, debt financing and payments, and customer credit to verify that they did in fact 
represent the same underlying planning construct. The items loaded maximally and uniquely onto a single factor, 
which had an eigenvalue of 1.863 and accounted for 93.1 percent of the variation. Only the first factor yielded 
eigenvalues greater than one. A Cronbach’s alpha test of the nine items reported an acceptable scale reliability 
coefficient of 0.702 (Nunnally, 1978). 11 
 
through family and friends (recruitment practices) (1 = yes). We also controlled for whether the 
organization offered product/service guarantees with after-sales/service support. We controlled 
for organizational age in years and organizational size in terms of the number of actual 
employees. Additionally, we controlled for 10 industry types using sector dummy identifiers 
(industry controls) (Mizruchi et al., 2006). At the environment level, we also controlled for the 
percentage of regional unemployment, the regional gross domestic product per capita, regional 
inflation using the regional consumer price index, and regional exports per capita. 
Analysis 
Although we know the year in which failed ventures ceased operation, the exact day of 
failure was missing for 80 percent of the firms. We therefore conducted a discrete-time history 
analysis to test our theory using a complementary log-log specification, which accounts for both 
the continuous nature of the actual exit process and the discrete nature of the data (Allison, 
1982). These models are of the form: log[-log(1-pit1t2)] = α+βXit1, where pit1t2 is the probability 
that firm i will survive during the period t1 to t2, Xit1 is a vector of covariates associated with firm 
i at time t1, β is its corresponding parameter vector, and α is a constant.
5 As a robustness test, we 
also conducted a logistic regression on the same model and produced similar results.  
---Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here--- 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations appear in Table 1. The results of the 
discrete-time logistic model of firm survival appear in Table 2. The results support hypotheses 1, 
3, 4, and 5, but not hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 1 theorized a relationship between violence and 
venture failure. We find that an increase in violence of one standard deviation increased the 
                                                 
5 Some of our variables were highly correlated (such as planning and planning squared, and GDP and violence), 
which can inflate standard errors and make regression coefficients unstable. We used a Gram–Schmidt procedure to 
partial out the common variance between the highly correlated variables (Sine, et al., 2005). We then tested for 
multicollinearity and found that all variance-inflation factors were less than 3.71. 12 
 
likelihood of failure by 10 percent. However, the results indicate that incremental planning does 
not differ significantly between ventures that survived and ventures that did not (hypothesis 2). 
We tested for curvilinear effects of incremental planning, but they were not statistically 
significant. This suggests that generally, the cost of frequently scanning and updating 
organizational routines is greater than its benefits. As predicted by hypothesis 3, we find that an 
increase in comprehensive planning of one standard deviation significantly increased firm 
survival by 2 percent; however, an increase in comprehensive planning of two standard 
deviations reduced firm survival by 3 percent, suggesting marginally declining benefits.  
We also find that violence moderates the effects of planning, as suggested by hypothesis 
4; a standard deviation increase in violence augmented the effects of incremental planning on 
firm survival by 4 percent. Similarly, we find that a one-standard deviation increase in violence 
decreased the effects of long-term planning on firm survival by 12 percent (hypothesis 5). In 
Model 8, the interaction between comprehensive planning squared and violence was not 
significant. Figure 1 compares comprehensive and incremental planning in environments of high 
political and civil violence. 
---Insert Figure 1 about here--- 
It is possible that planning is an indicator of unobserved venture capabilities. We believe 
this is unlikely because all the ventures in this sample were young and had little time to create 
organizational capabilities.
6 Nevertheless, if planning is merely an indicator of unobserved 
venture capabilities, these results suggest that capabilities that may be highly predictive of 
                                                 
6 In order to control for potential unobserved venture capabilities linked to organizational experience, we included 
venture age. As a further robustness test of these results, we ran the same model using data from the first survey to 
predict survival one year later. The results did not differ significantly from model 7. Because all the ventures in this 
analysis were fairly young and extremely small, capabilities were more likely to be linked to the founder’s human 
capital rather than to established organizational routines. Thus, we included controls for entrepreneurial experience, 
education, and age, and resources such as firm size, and paid and unpaid employees. 13 
 
success in stable environments are predictive of failure in unstable environments characterized 
by high levels of violence, an interesting finding in and of itself. 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we showed that high levels of violence affect new venture survival in two 
ways. First, by fostering uncertainty and erratic behavior among entrepreneurs, suppliers, 
customers, and creditors, environments characterized by relatively high levels of violence disrupt 
resource flows and vital organizational routines, thereby increasing firm failure. It was not 
political and civil violence per se that decreased the survival rates of entrepreneurial firms: less 
than 0.1 percent of the firms in our sample were direct targets of organized violence. Instead, we 
argue that the impact of violence on venture survival was due to how such environments affect 
risk perception and decision processes by entrepreneurs and their constituents. These effects are 
substantial. Our results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in violence translates into 
the failure of an additional 120,000 Colombian new ventures, triggering a loss of over 257,000 
jobs. Second, violence and the resulting uncertainty and environmental change moderate the 
effects of entrepreneurial planning by increasing the adaptive benefits of day-to-day incremental 
planning and decreasing the benefits of forward-looking comprehensive planning, thereby 
affecting new venture longevity. The differential effects of these two types of planning are 
impressive. If entrepreneurs in violent regions of Colombia increased incremental planning by 
one standard deviation, 6000 additional ventures would be saved; in contrast, an increase of one 
standard deviation from the mean in comprehensive planning would translate into 4800 more 
venture failures. Whereas incremental planning has no significant impact on venture mortality in 
stable environments, it can be an effective strategy for mitigating the effects of high levels of 
violence.  14 
 
  Our study contributes to entrepreneurship and strategy research in several ways. First, it 
builds upon the institutionally informed view of strategy by demonstrating how prior theory on 
business planning does not hold in areas characterized by high violence (Peng et al., 2009). 
Previous studies assert that planning is beneficial in uncertain environments because it provides 
firms with valuable information, contingencies, and an accessible set of actions to readily 
implement (Armstrong, 1982). While we find that this proposition is supported for incremental 
planning, our results indicate that high levels of comprehensive planning in environments of high 
civil and political violence have a net negative effect on new venture survival. 
Second, prior work has been deeply divided on the utility of business planning for the 
survival of start-up firms (Delmar and Shane, 2003; Pearce, Freeman, and Robinson, 1987). 
Much of this conflict may be due to prior studies failing to differentiate between various types of 
new venture planning, treating it as a single construct, and failing to take into account the 
institutional environment. We offer a potential explanation for the discrepancies between past 
empirical studies by distinguishing incremental (day-to-day operational) from comprehensive 
(forward-looking strategic) planning and theorizing and empirically testing the differential 
effects of these planning processes on new venture survival rates in varying institutional 
contexts. 
This study is particularly relevant to entrepreneurs and organizations promoting new 
venture planning in countries experiencing violence and civil unrest such as war, civil war, or 
piracy. Currently, prospective entrepreneurs are taught the importance of business planning by 
both universities and non-governmental organizations that offer entrepreneurial training. 
Qualitative interviews at non-governmental organizations and universities in Colombia suggest 
that these organizations train prospective Colombian entrepreneurs to engage in comprehensive 
planning. Our empirical data support this finding: Entrepreneurs who had received training were 15 
 
more likely to engage in strategic planning by 1.58 times (p<.001). In such contexts where 
violence is high, these training programs may actually increase the likelihood of new venture 
failure. 
Fruitful avenues for future research include exploring other types of strategic actions that 
entrepreneurs and managers can take to reduce the negative impact of political and civil unrest. 
For instance, how would ties to powerful coercive actors such as the military in countries with 
weak formal institutions mitigate the negative effects of such contexts? Finally, while this study 
demonstrates the short-term benefit of modifying planning processes according to the level of 
violence, it also begs the question: What are the long-term implications of such survival 
strategies on innovation and economic productivity at the organizational and societal levels? 
Finding answers to these questions will help us better understand the consequences of political 
and civil unrest on national economies.  
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Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
 
   Variables  Mean  St.  Dev.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9 
1  New  venture  survival  0.584  0.493  1           
2  Political  and  civil  violence  -0.090  1.026  -0.068  1           
3  Incremental  planning  2.618  4.616  -0.036  -0.003  1          
4  Comprehensive planning   -0.066  1.174  0.086  -0.253  0.102  1           
5  Entrepreneur's gender (male)  0.381  0.486  -0.050 0.224 0.017 -0.115  1         
6  Entrepreneur's education level  4.299  1.685  -0.019 0.083 0.164 0.097 0.043  1       
7 
Entrepreneur's prior years of 
work experience  5.166  7.416  0.003  0.096 -0.061 0.007 0.112 -0.067  1     
8 
Entrepreneur owns another 
business 0.170  0.375  0.041  -0.084  0.041 0.081 -0.071 0.051 -0.044  1   
9  Entrepreneur currently studies  0.452  0.498  -0.142  0.025 0.038 0.035 -0.043 0.068 -0.033 0.015  1 
10 
Entrepreneur has a secondary 
job 0.056  0.230  -0.027  -0.013  -0.024  0.078 0.000 0.092 -0.044 -0.008  0.004 
11  Entrepreneur's age  42.390  11.754  0.053  0.055  -0.124 -0.182 0.013 -0.266 0.196  -0.006  -0.014 
12  Number of nonpaid workers  0.275  0.731  0.047  -0.111 0.026 0.006 -0.042 -0.126 -0.057  0.028  0.030 
13  Number if apprentices  0.042  0.268  0.050  0.050  0.000 -0.011 0.126 -0.004 0.177  -0.001  -0.059 
14  Number of temporary workers  0.591  6.290  0.049  -0.015 0.020 -0.003 -0.035 -0.029 -0.027  0.014  -0.050 
15  Recruitment practices  0.536  0.499  -0.022  0.087  0.072 -0.052 0.246 0.080 0.047  -0.035  0.001 
16 
Offers product/service 
guarantees 0.708  0.455  -0.038  0.080  0.099 0.076 0.107 0.074 0.033  0.032  0.137 
17  Offers after-sales support  0.197  0.398  -0.028  0.094 0.129 0.125 0.079 0.176 0.081 -0.014  0.008 
18  Organizational age  6.525  5.070  0.141  -0.042  -0.022 -0.040 0.034 -0.030 0.065  0.011  -0.067 
19  Organizational size  3.604  5.912  0.001  0.101  0.253 -0.022 0.075 0.237 0.012  0.028  0.043 
20  Consumer price index  17.087  2.293  0.094  -0.054  -0.296 -0.024 -0.172 -0.181 0.001  0.002  -0.276 
21 
Gross domestic product per 
capita 6.781  2.069  -0.116  -0.094  0.260 0.074 0.132 0.159 0.021 -0.003  0.438 
22  Exports per capita  394.384 219.484 0.003  0.779  0.041 -0.103 0.082 0.039 0.026  -0.008  0.012 
23  Unemployment 14.654  3.097  -0.147  0.395  0.259 -0.050 0.160 0.153 0.005  -0.038  0.414 
 19 
 
TABLE 1 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
 
   10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17  18  19  20  21  22 
10  1                    
11  -0.060  1                  
12  -0.040  0.075  1                
13  0.014  0.036  -0.025  1               
14  0.001  0.009  -0.018  -0.004 1             
15  0.019  -0.018  0.222  0.123 -0.042 1            
16  -0.069  -0.067  -0.044  0.050 0.034 0.050 1          
17  0.045  -0.019  -0.065  0.029 -0.007 0.030 0.126 1         
18  -0.047 0.299  0.030 0.081 0.011 0.006 0.020 0.104 1       
19  0.009 0.016  0.027 0.091 0.050 0.131 0.087 0.227 0.099 1      
20  0.045 0.028  0.066  -0.007 0.026 -0.207 -0.181 -0.111 0.040 -0.241 1     
21  -0.029 -0.010  -0.027 -0.016 -0.041 0.205 0.159 0.114 -0.053 0.220 -0.860 1   
22  -0.026 0.012 -0.073 0.034 -0.047 -0.007 0.059 0.091 -0.037 0.031 -0.017 -0.206 1 




Discrete-time logistic regression of organizational survival 
 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Independent variables          
H1 Political and civil violence    -0.204*** -0.208***  -0.166**  -0.160** -0.201*** -0.195*** -0.176** 
    (0.066) (0.066)  (0.069)  (0.068) (0.072) (0.073) (0.089) 
H2 Incremental planning     -0.004  -0.005  -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
     (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Comprehensive planning          0.094**  0.103** 0.097** 0.096** 0.091** 
      (0.037)  (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) 
H3 Comprehensive planning squared            -0.070** -0.072** -0.065** -0.068** 
       (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) 
H4 Incremental planning X Political violence             0.018** 0.021** 0.022** 
         (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
H5 Comprehensive planning X Political 
violence               -0.100**  -0.106** 
        (0.047)  (0.050) 
Comprehensive planning squared X Political 
violence                 -0.027 
          (0.073) 
Entrepreneur variables          
Entrepreneur’s gender (male)  -0.187** -0.129  -0.129  -0.115  -0.113 -0.108 -0.109 -0.109 
  (0.086) (0.088) (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
Entrepreneur’s education level  0.013 0.018 0.019  0.014  0.013 0.015 0.013 0.013 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Entrepreneur’s years of prior work experience  -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entrepreneur owns another business  0.123 0.097 0.098  0.091  0.085 0.088 0.091 0.092 
  (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)  (0.105)  (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
Entrepreneur currently studies  -0.242** -0.250** -0.256*** -0.264*** -0.249** -0.264*** -0.272*** -0.272*** 
  (0.096) (0.097) (0.098)  (0.102)  (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) 
Entrepreneur has a secondary job  -0.138 -0.126 -0.128 -0.165 -0.167 -0.166 -0.164 -0.167 
  (0.177) (0.178) (0.179)  (0.179)  (0.179) (0.179) (0.179) (0.179) 
Entrepreneur’s age  0.001 0.002 0.002  0.003  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 21 
 
Organizational variables            
Number of nonpaid employees  0.052 0.035 0.035  0.036  0.028 0.023 0.027 0.029 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Number of apprentices  0.273 0.239 0.238  0.238  0.252 0.255 0.242 0.243 
  (0.167) (0.164) (0.164)  (0.162)  (0.162) (0.161) (0.162) (0.162) 
Number of temporary employees  0.063 0.071 0.071  0.061  0.060 0.060 0.068 0.069 
  (0.043) (0.045) (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.045) (0.044) (0.046) (0.047) 
Recruitment practices  -0.034 -0.004 -0.004  0.003  -0.002 -0.002 -0.014 -0.015 
  (0.086) (0.087) (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) 
Offers product/service guarantees  -0.025 0.000 0.001 -0.008 -0.018 -0.012 -0.025 -0.023 
  (0.089) (0.090) (0.090)  (0.090)  (0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) 
Offers after-sales support  -0.109 -0.106 -0.106 -0.138 -0.135 -0.135 -0.142 -0.142 
  (0.107) (0.107) (0.108)  (0.109)  (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) 
Organizational age  0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039***  0.039***  0.038*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Organizational size  -0.001 0.001 0.002  0.003  0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Industry controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Environmental variables            
Regional consumer price index  -0.019 -0.004 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 -0.010 -0.011 
  (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
Regional gross domestic product per capita  0.090 0.126 0.133  0.094  0.099 0.112 0.084 0.082 
  (0.147) (0.146) (0.146)  (0.148)  (0.147) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) 
Regional exports per capita  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  0.001***  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regional unemployment  -0.091*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.084*** 
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Constant  1.059 0.338 0.321  0.302  0.397 0.304 0.495 0.520 
  (0.889) (0.902) (0.904)  (0.907)  (0.906) (0.909) (0.913) (0.915) 
Wald chi squared  83.60*** 92.02*** 91.76*** 78.94*** 100.80*** 104.18*** 108.50*** 108.56***
Standard errors in parentheses      




Figure 1  
 
 